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Abstract
I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as 
corollaries, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, Wilson’s extension of Arrow’s to 
non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen’s 
result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.
The theorem shows that these classical results are not only similar, but actually
share a common root. 
The theorem expresses a simple but deep fact that transcends each of its
particular applications: it expresses the tension between decentralizing the 
choice of aggregate into partial choices based on preferences over pairs of 
alternatives, and the need for some coordination in these decisions, so as to 
avoid contradictory recommendations. 
* This paper is based on the second part of my invited lecture at the 5thmeeting of the Social Choice and Welfare 
Society (Alicante, June 29 - July 2, 2000). I am grateful to Michael Florig, Jean Fraysse, Matthew Jackson, 
Cristina Rata, Peter Vida and especially to Carmen Beviá for their comments and help. I thank the editor of 
Social Choice and Welfare and one anonymous referee for their careful comments, and Bernard Monjardet for 
extensive historical remarks, from which I have drawn freely. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of 
Education and Culture through grant PB98-0870, from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through 
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Barcelona Economics WP nº 1661. Introduction
I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. The substance of the theorem is to 
exhibit the tension between two general principles. One principle would consider the
possibility of decomposing the choice of a social aggregate into a set of partial decisions, each 
one based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives. The other principle would require that no 
agent plays a dominant role in the aggregation process. I show that, in the presence of some
other requirements, decomposable rules can only avoid contradictory recommendations in the 
presence of the strongest coordination device: a single agent being determinant at all times on 
all aspects of the global decision. 
The theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's
extension of Arrow's theorem to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem and Sen's result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. Hence, one contribution of 
the paper is to provide a common framework that includes as particular cases all the different
classes of aggregation rules that these classic theorems refer to. This allows us to understand 
the many connections that had already been noted among the substance and also among the
proofs of these different results. In particular, it clarifies that the connections between Arrow's
and Gibbard's results go deeper than any parallelism in their proofs; both come from a
common root. It also allows us to note the intimate connection between other results, like
Arrow's and Sen's, which had passed less noticed (with some significant exceptions that I refer 
to later).
Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems consider social welfare functions. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem applies to social choice functions, and Sen’s result is expressed for
social decision functions. All of these functions have a common domain: the profiles of 
individual preferences on some set of alternatives. All of them map these profiles into some
type of related object, which we call an aggregate. Aggregates are different objects in each of 
these formulations. In Arrow’s and Wilson’s framework, an aggregate is a preference order
satisfying the same properties that are required from individual preferences. In Sen’s
formulation, an aggregate is an acyclic binary relation (thus not necessarily transitive when 
social indifferences are allowed). In the context where the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
applies, aggregates are simply alternatives.
My theorem refers to preference aggregation rules. These are functions which map
profiles of preferences on alternatives into some set of unspecified objects, to be called
aggregates. They include all of the above as special cases. Specifically, the theorem
concentrates on the class of preference aggregation rules that I call local. All of the classical
results I have mentioned refer to special cases of local aggregation. It is thus important to 
clarify the concept immediately.
Local aggregation rules are based on the idea that different parts of the information
contained in preference profiles can be used in making partial choices among aggregates, and 
that these partial choices eventually determine the one aggregate which corresponds to each 
grant BEC2002-002130, and from the Generalitat of Catalonia through grant SGR2001-00162 is gratefully
acknowledged.
2profile. Not all preference aggregation rules admit a description in these terms, but many do. 
Formal definitions come in Section 2, but we should discuss immediately the meaning of local 
aggregation.
When given an aggregation rule, it may be hard to find out what is the algorithm, the 
procedure or the set of considerations which lead to associate a certain aggregate to a given
preference profile. But here is one possible way to do it, which characterizes local
aggregation: (1) First, identify some pieces of information that will be considered relevant. In
our formulation of local rules, we'll consider that the set of comparisons made by the agents
between each pair of alternatives are the pieces of relevant information. (2) Second, associate 
a set of aggregates to each piece of relevant information. We can consider this set as the 
collection of aggregates that are admissible, given the information at hand. For example, if 
aggregators are binary relations, (like those we obtain from majority rule), we can associate to 
each set of individual comparisons between x and y the set of all binary relations which rank x
as preferred to y, or the set of all those which rank y over x. As another example, consider
social choice functions, which aggregate preferences and choose one alternative to be the 
aggregate. In that case, a local rule could associate a set of alternatives to each piece of 
relevant information, and interpret that the elements in each of these sets are the potential 
aggregates whose choice is not precluded by the information available. (3) Third, describe the 
social aggregate as the result of combining the use of all the relevant pieces of information.
Specifically, the chosen aggregate should be the one (and only one, in our formulation), which 
belongs to all the sets of non-excluded aggregates obtained from using all the available pieces 
of relevant information. They can be a binary relation, obtained as the intersection of sets of 
binary relations, or an alternative, resulting from intersecting sets of alternatives, or any other
abstract object which belongs to the intersection of sets of objects in the relevant class of
aggregates.
Limiting attention to local rules is somewhat restrictive. Many aggregation rules one
can think of, like the Borda counts and other point voting rules, do not adjust to the structure
required by this condition. But we shall see that a theorem on local rules is able to cover 
substantial ground. 
More specifically, the theorem is about local and restricted aggregation rules. As
already pointed out, the aggregates obtained from a local rule can be described as 
combinations of objects that satisfy some features, but not all combinations of features are 
necessarily acceptable to form an aggregate. For example, the feature of ranking x over y is 
acceptable for aggregates which are orders. So is ranking y over z. And so is ranking z over x.
These three features would be compatible if the binary relation which results from aggregation
was not restricted any further, as with majority rule. But the three features together cannot be 
met by an aggregate binary relation, if we further require this relation to satisfy transitivity, as
Arrow or Wilson do, or acyclicity, as in Sen. Similarly, admissible features of an aggregate in 
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite setting are that the aggregate is not x, that it is not y, and so on, for
any possible alternative. But the union of all these features cannot be met by any aggregate, 
because only the empty set, which is not an acceptable aggregate, can meet them all. Again in
Section 2, I provide a formal definition for a local rule to be restricted, which is enough to 
capture all the limitations in the choice of an aggregate that is imposed by our classical 
reference theorems, in each of the cases. 
3As pointed out by Bernard Monjardet in private correspondence, this view of an 
aggregation process is not only natural but has a long tradition. I quote from Monjardet’s 
generous comments: 
"In his Memoire Recherches sur la loi de croissance de I'homme published in 1832 the 
statistician and social scientist Quetelet proposed to define the "mean man" of a population of
men described by several measurable characteristics by taking the means on each 
characteristics. This conception was severely criticized by people like the mathematician
Cournot which remarked (In Exposition de la théorie des chances, Paris 1843) that this mean
man could be nothing else that an impossible man. Indeed one meets a similar "paradox" by 
considering the triangle obtained by taking the 3 means of the lengths of the corresponding 
sides of a set of rectangular triangles; this triangle is not necessary rectangular. More generally
Cournot writes: "Lorsqu'on applique la détermination des moyennes aux diverses parties d'un
système compliqué, il faut bien prendre garde que ces valeurs moyennes peuvent ne pas se
convertir: en sorte que l'état du système dans lequel tous les elements prendraint à la fois le 
valeurs moyennes déterminées séparément pour chacun d'eux serait un état impossible"
1. For 
Cournot, a 19 th century mathematician, a mean is any mathematical mean defined on 
numerical values. But more generally any p-ary operation defined on a set and satisfying some
properties (like idempotence) can be called a mean and the Cournot text can be applied to any 
aggregation procedure which is "local" in the sense that it is obtained by 
1) Decomposing the set of complex objects (to aggregate) into sets of simple objects. 
2) Applying mean operation to each of the sets. 
3) Recomposing a complex object from obtained simple objects. 
The "effet Condorcet" (or paradox of voting) is another famous example of the
difficulty met by such a procedure and the relation between these various aggregation 
paradoxes and the Arrow's theorem has been developed in the (unfortunately not sufficiently 
read) 1952 paper by Guilbaud.” 
Let me just add that in the present formulation I have been completely agnostic about 
the nature of the object to be called an aggregate. This radical decision makes it hard to give 
explicit meaning to attractive notions like that of a “mean”, or that of “closeness”. Otherwise, I
feel very comfortable and happy to work within a model with such an old and distinguished 
tradition.
Within the realm of local and restricted aggregators, the theorem expresses a tension 
between two features which are essential in the description of a rule: these are its flexibility,
and the way in which it distributes among agents the power to influence its result. We say that 
a rule is flexible if two conditions hold: one, that for each pair of alternatives, the rule's
outcome is sometimes sensitive to changes in the relative positions of these two alternatives 
alone; and two, that this sensitivity should not be conditional on the position of any third 
1 Compare with my previous remark that "since not all combinations of characteristics for an aggregate are jointly 
compatible, the fully decentralized choices of characteristics for aggregators across different pairs of alternatives 
may be contradictory".
4alternative. We say that one agent concentrates all power under a rule if only the preferences 
of this agent (when they are strict) determine the social aggregate. 
I prove that if a preference aggregation rule is local and restricted, then either it is not
flexible or else it gives all decision power to a single individual.
From this theorem we can derive as corollaries all the above mentioned classical 
results. Providing a common framework for such disparate theorems is interesting per se. In 
some cases (Arrow and Wilson), the close connection was obvious from the start. Yet, the 
present formulation allows for a better understanding of the role played by the Pareto 
condition in Arrow, and in particular reinforces Wilson’s message that this role is quite 
limited. In the case of Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite, the existence of a close connection 
has been very well understood for years, but claiming that both results are a corollary of a
unique theorem is a stronger and novel statement. The connection established here between 
Sen’s result and the rest may be more problematic because Sen's model and its interpretation
are themselves subject to debate (Salles, 2000). At any rate, Saari (1998) had emphasized the 
relationship between Sen’s and Arrow’s result, by using a different line of argument. We
discuss all these connections later, in Section 3. 
I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that all I do here is to force old 
results into a common frame for the sake of it. I already pointed out that the theorem has 
content and meaning of its own: the tensions between locality, restriction and flexibility can 
only be solved by an extreme distribution of decision power. Moreover, this content is clearly 
reflected in the structure of its proof, which follows the essential line of two proofs of Arrow’s
and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem that I provided some twenty years ago (Barberà, 1980, 
1983a, 1983b). These separate proofs are now blended into a single one, which reveals the 
essence of the difficulty at hand. Local aggregation requires the decomposition of our choice 
of aggregate into partial choices, each of which must be exclusively dependent on the relative 
positions of some pair of alternatives. Although possibly centralized among agents, decisions
are decentralized in terms of the influence exerted by different pairs of alternatives in 
determining which aggregates are ruled out as possible candidates. Since not all combinations
of characteristics for an aggregate are jointly compatible, the fully decentralized choices of 
characteristics for aggregators across different pairs of alternatives may be contradictory. 
Some connections must be ensured between the choices made for some pairs and the choices 
made by some others. It turns out that, for any given preference profile, and as long as rules 
are flexible, this restricts the ability to influence the choice of aggregate to a single agent.
Moreover, this local concentration of power extends to become global: only a single agent can 
make a difference, at any preference profile (as long as this agent holds strict preferences). 
The need for coordinated action becomes extreme: only one agent can make any difference at 
all!
Before I finish this Introduction, let me comment on some related papers. The 
connections between Arrow's theorem and the issue of manipulability had been remarked (see
Vickrey, 1960) even before Gibbard's formulation of his celebrated theorem. Gibbard's proof 
relies on Arrow's, and establishes a connection that was later stressed by Satterthwaite (1975), 
Mueller and Satterthwaite (1977) and many other authors. One should point out that the 
possibility of defining a nondictatorial Arrowian Social Welfare Function on a given domain
5of preferences, or that of defining a nondictatorial strategy-proof social choice function on the
same domain are logically independent questions: there are domains where one of the two
objectives can be achieved and not the other. But the connection is tight for universal domains,
the ones considered here, and also for the domains of single-peaked preferences (Barberà, Gul
and Stacchetti, 1993). 
For universal domains, the present theorem offers a convincing explanation of why so 
many parallels have been observed between the two classics: there is a general statement that 
covers both!
Regarding proofs, Arrow's own (Arrow 1963), which has been refined by many other 
authors (see Sen, 1970, for a very nice version), relies on a careful analysis of the global 
decision power of coalitions: it is first observed that, under Arrow's conditions, if a coalition is
decisive for a pair it must be decisive for all pairs; it is then proven that if a coalition is
decisive and can be broken into subcoalitions, one of these subcoalitions must also be 
decisive; finally, observing that the grand coalition is decisive allows to prove the theorem. In
the preceding argument, decisiveness is the ability to determine the outcome of aggregation at 
all preference profiles: a coalition is either decisive or not. As already mentioned, Gibbard's
(1973) early proof, and many that followed, used a construct that allowed to prove that result 
by indirectly appealing to Arrow's theorem. There exist many proofs of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem, using different approaches. Those by Schmeidler and Sonnenschein 
(1978), Batteau, Blin and Monjardet (1981) or Barberà and Peleg (1990) did constitute real 
innovations by the time they appeared. Recent interest on the subject is obvious: three simple
proofs of the theorem have been published recently (Benoit, 2000; Sen, 2001; and Reny, 
2001). One of them (Reny, 2001) highlights the parallelism between the proofs of Arrow and 
(one of the) proofs of Gibbard-Satterthwaite. A very recent paper by Eliaz (2001) makes the 
point that both theorems are corollaries of a larger result. In that sense, the paper by Eliaz 
emphasizes, as my paper does, the fact that there is a deeper connection between these results
than just a parallelism. Other than that, however, the paper by Eliaz and the present paper 
proceed quite differently, both in the formal model and in the type of proof.
My strategy of proof here follows the line of my already mentioned papers in the early
eighties (Barberà 1980, 1983a, 1983b), which were the first to exploit the role of pivotal 
voters. The proof starts by considering the ability of agents to change the outcomes of the 
aggregation process at a given preference profile: it concentrates on a local property. Then I
proceed to show that, under the conditions of the paper, if one agent can affect the outcome of 
the aggregation process at some profile, it must be able to affect it at any profile.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I present notation, formal definitions and a
statement of the theorem in a simplified framework (Section 2). Then I discuss the relationship 
between the general theorem and the classical results (Section 3). Section 4 concludes, with a 
discussion of the possibility for a more general version of the theorem and its proof.
62. A simple version of the Theorem
Let  be a finite set of agents () . ^ n N ,..., 2 , 1   `
`
2 t n
Let  be a finite set of alternatives ( ^ ,... , y x X   3 t X ).
Let  be a set of aggregates. ^ ,... , 2 1 a a A   `
A 2  stands for the power set of  . A is the set of singletons in  . A
A 2
D stands for the set of distinct pairs of alternatives.
Let P be the set of linear orders
2 (complete, antisymmetric, transitive binary relations)
on X . Elements of P are called preferences.
Elements of P are preference profiles. Preference profiles are denoted by
n P , ' P , etc. 
Given a preference profile P , and any set   of alternatives, denote by  the profile of 
preferences on   such that, for all i
S ) (S P
SN  ,  is the restriction of i’s preference  to the
set . In particular, we denote by   the preference profile on the pair
) S ( P i i P
S ) (xy Py x,  induced by the 
profile P  on  X .
Alternatives  and   are contiguous in   iff for all x y i P X z ,} , { y x z , y zP x zP i i l .
Alternatives  and   are contiguous in  x y P  iff they are contiguous in  , for all i i P N  .
Profiles P  where two alternatives are contiguous play an important role in my setup, because
they can be changed to other profiles  ' P  where  ) ( ' ) ( xy P xy P z  while keeping
 for all other pairs   other than  ) ( ) ( zw zw P   ' Pw z, y x,.
Profiles P  and  ' P  are xy-equivalent iff ) ( ' ) ( xy P xy P   . Otherwise, say that P  and ' P
differ on  x, . Profiles y P  and 
' P only differ on x,y if they differ on  y x, , and they are  -
equivalent for any pair   other than 
zw
w z, y x, . Clearly, if P  and  ' P  only differ on  x,  it must
be that 
y
x and   are contiguous in the preferences of all agents, both in  y P  and  ' P .
Profiles P  and  ' P differ on i iff . They only differ on i iff  and 
for all 
'
i i P P z
'
i i P P z
'
j j P P  
i j z . They only differ on x,y for i, if they only differ on i and they only differ on  y x,.
Contiguity of a pair of alternatives is a special case of what I will call connectedness of
a set of alternatives with respect to a preference. Formally, X B   is connected in   if only 
if for all 
i P
B y x  ,, B A z \  ,. y i zP x i zP l B is connected in P  if it is connected for all  . 's i P
2 Notice that I assume preferences to be strict (no indifferences are allowed among different alternatives, by 
antisymmetry). This simplifies the exposition.
7An aggregation rule (on the universal domain P ) is a function
n
: f  PA
n o
assigning a single aggregate to each preference profile
3.
An aggregation rule   is local iff for each pair { fy x,} D, there exist functions




n  o \ 2A
, ) ( ) ( P g P f
xy
f  
 y x, D,
and
(1) for each xX y ,, P ,' P ,
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [




f   o   ,
that is,   is a function of 
xy
f g x and  's relative position in a profile, for any profile.  y










y x  ,
4.
Locality is a demanding requirement on aggregation rules. Locality requires that the
global decision on which aggregator to attach to any given preference profile should be 
decomposable into partial decisions, one for each pair of alternatives, depending only on the 
ranking of this pair of alternatives in the profile
5. Each partial decision attached to one pair of 
alternatives is a set of aggregators, and the global decision is the unique aggregator belonging 
to all of the sets selected, for each pair of alternatives, given the preference profile. Locality 
3 Notice that I model the function as choosing a singleton set in A, rather than an alternative in A. This is to keep
as formal as possible. 
4 This second requirement could be relaxed to cover several additional interesting cases. In particular, I could
allow for the image of some ’s to consist of a single value. This would leave room to include the constant
functions (and others) among the local we could also allow for more than two sets in the range. This would
extend the reach of the theorem’s applications to cover, among others, the case of Arrowian aggregation when
social preferences can express indifference between pairs of alternatives. And it would require a careful
modification of the way to define restricted aggregators (see my concluding remarks). I have chosen to keep this
somewhat restrictive requirement (2) for expositional clarity.
xy
f g
5 Of course, this is extremely close to the idea that the aggregation rule satisfies Arrow's Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives. But I prefer to refer to it by another term because (1) it applies to a larger context, and (2)
it implies the description of aggregation as the intersection of sets, which is neither necessary nor implied by
Arrow's formulation.
8also requires that the set of aggregators  associated to each  ) (P g
xy
f xy-pair at profile P  should 
only depend on the relative ranking of  x and   in the preferences of the agents, at that 
profile. Finally, the range of the partial decision functions  is restricted to a limited number

















f P g ) (  the element in the 
range of   which is not chosen at 
xy
f g P .
Before we proceed, let us see how this formulation applies to the frameworks of other 
classical results.
Consider the simple version of Arrow’s theorem where the preferences of agents, as 
well as the preferences for society (the aggregates) are required to be linear orders. First notice 
that under the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, the social order between
any two alternatives x, , at any preference profile  y P , will be determined only by the ranking 
of x and   in the preferences of individuals at  y P . Hence, given a preference profile and two 
alternatives, x, , one of the two possibilities “ y x preferred to  ” or “  preferred to  yy x” will 
be excluded. The set of all orders of alternatives ranking x and   in the nonexcluded position 




f P . Indeed, the image  will be the 
order respecting the nonexcluded positions for all pairs. Hence, it is clear that any IIA social 
welfare function can be written as a local aggregation function, where the aggregate is the
intersection of sets of nonexcluded orders; a similar reasoning applies in the framework
considered by Wilson.
) (P f
The analysis of strategy proof rules as local aggregators builds on two essential 
remarks already made by Gibbard (1973). One is that, when all agents agree that all 
alternatives in a set   are preferred by all agents to all alternatives in  , then a strategy-
proof social choice function must choose from . (I assume here that the set of alternatives
equals the range of a strategy-proof social choice function. If not, drop the alternatives not in 
the range and start again, with no loss of generality). This implies, in particular, unanimity: an 
alternative must be chosen if it is unanimously considered to be the best by all agents. The 
second remark is that, if an alternative
SS X \
S
x is chosen when  x and   are the best two 
alternatives for all agents, then   cannot be chosen at any preference profile where the order 
of these two alternatives is preserved. Building on these two remarks, notice that the outcome 




P , and each pair x, , determine which one of the two alternatives is definitely a non-
candidate to be the aggregate at this profile. For this, check which one of the two alternatives
would not be elected at the profile  obtained from 
y
) (xy P P  and where, ceteris paribus, x and
 become the top two alternatives from all agents. y
9Now, any strategy-proof social choice function can be written as a local aggregation
function, where for each pair of alternatives x, , either the set  or the set   are 
retained (the one not containing the alternative which is eliminated by pairwise comparisons).
The aggregate corresponding to each profile must clearly be expressed as the intersection of
all the sets of non-excluded alternatives, for each pairwise comparison.
y x X \ y X \
Having illustrated the basic features of local aggregation rules, let us now go back to 
study some further requirements.








) ( ) , (.
We can interpret  as the set of aggregates which are not excluded on the basis 
of the comparisons of pairs in  . Clearly, with this notation, G D ) ), for all 
) , ( D P G
D , (P (P f   P .
We say that  is xy-sensitive at  f P  iff
G P f   ) (( P , D) P G( z , D \{ y }  x,
comp
P xy
f g » ¼
º
« ¬
ª  ) ( ).
Thus,  is xy-sensitive at  f P  if a change in the value of the xy-partial selection would 
change the value of the global selection of aggregate. 
The notion of sensitivity is introduced because it is not always the case that the change
in one of the partial decisions associated to one pair of alternatives can change the global 
outcome. This depends on the type of aggregate we consider. Since we want to cover different 
types of aggregates, and provide a result that is independent of the type of aggregate under 
consideration, we cannot be more specific on the connections between changes in the partial 
decisions and eventual changes in the aggregate. In Arrow's framework, where each partial 
decision determines the ranking of a pair of alternatives within the overall ranking of
alternatives, any change in one partial decision is translated into a change in the aggregate.
Yet, in Gibbard's framework, the same is not true. Starting from some preference profile, you 
may change the partial recommendation on a pair x, y, and yet see a third alternative z be 
elected before and after the change: the aggregation rule would not then be xy-sensitive at that 
profile.
We say that  is restricted iff, for all fX z y x  , , , and all profiles P  where   is xy-
















10To better understand this assumption, let us again go back to examples. In Arrow's
framework, for each function  , the range consists of two possible outcomes, each of which 
is a set of orders: the orders with 
xy
f g
x over  , on the one hand, and the orders with   over  yy x,
on the other. The fact that aggregates must be orders implies that our aggregation function 
must be restricted: indeed, take any profile and any triple  x, , . If at the initial profile y z P  we
have x over  , then the set of orders with  y x over   appears in the intersection of values 
defining the aggregate at 
y
P . Then, the set of orders with   over  , and the set of orders with 
 over 
yz
z x, both in the ranges of   and  , respectively, will have an empty intersection





f P . Likewise, if at P  we had that 
stood over 
y
x, then the choices of sets of orders with x over   and  over   would have led 
to the empty intersection required by restriction. 
zz y
Thus, the condition called restriction in our general theorem corresponds in Arrow’s 
theorem to the requirement of transitivity of the social aggregate.
The social choice functions in Gibbard-Satterthwaite are also restricted local 
aggregators: indeed, for each pair of alternatives, the ranges of the functions  consist of 
two well-defined sets: all alternatives except 
xy
f g
x and all alternatives except . Notice that, for
any triple 
y
x, ,  of alternatives, and any profile  yz P  where   is f xy-sensitive and also -
sensitive, the intersection of all the partial selections at
yz
P , other than those for xy and  ,
must contain 
yz
x,  and  . But then, the choice of   from the range of  , coupled with 








y X f g x and  in the 
overall intersection. Since only singletons, not two-element sets of aggregates, can be in the
range of  , we have identified a restriction to be satisfied by the social choice functions 
considered in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite setup. 
z
f
Hence, a rule is restricted if not all partial choices for different pairs are compatible
with an acceptable global choice, when these partial choices do make a difference. A restricted 
local aggregation rule is thus one for which the choices of the different sets of aggregates 
associated to each pair of alternatives is not completely free: some combinations of potential 
choices would not be able to produce any aggregate at all. Hence, some coordination among
partial outcomes will be necessary in order to obtain one and only one aggregator for each
particular profile. 
We say that  is flexible iff for some triple of alternatives , there is some
profile
fX z y x  , ,
P  at which 
(1) The set ^  is connected in the preferences of all agents at  ` z y x , , P ,
(2)  is  f xy-sensitive and also -sensitive at  yz P ,
(3) ,D\^` ,^` ) P G( y x, z x, z   comp P xz
f g P xy




f P g P g  
11and
P G( ,D\^` ) ^ z x z y , , , ` z   comp P xz
f g P yz




f P g P g  
In words, condition 3 requires that 's xy-sensitivity and yz-sensitivity at  f P  would be 
preserved by changes in the value of  .
xz
f g
Flexibility encompasses two requirements. One is that, for each pair of alternatives,
their relative position alone can sometime make a difference. The other, complementary
requirement, is that if the relative positions of two pairs make a difference at the same profile, 
then the relative position of any third alternative does not affect the rule’s sensitivity with 
regard to any of these two pairs. 
In Arrow's framework, flexibility is an implication of the Pareto axiom and IIA. In
Gibbard's and Satterthwaite's, the connection requires more care and it is discussed below, in 
section 3.4. 
Agent concentrates all power under rule  iff, for all preference profiles  if P ,' P  and 
all pairs x,, y
> @ ) ' ( ) ( ) ( ) (




f i i   o   .
Notice that, then, we can write each partial function as  , and that then   can 




) ( i P f P .
Also notice that a dictator (with strict preferences) concentrates all power, but that an 
anti-dictator also does, and so do any agents whose preferences are the only relevant inputs to 
determine the outcome of an aggregation rule.
Theorem
If an aggregation rule is local, flexible and restricted, then there is a single agent i who 
concentrates all the power under  . f
Proof
Let  be local, flexible and restricted. We first provide some useful definitions.  f
We say that agent i  is xy-pivotal at preference profile P  iff  ' P  such that P  and ' P
only differ in xy for agent i  and such that ) ' ( ) ( P f P f z . (Clearly, if agent i  is xy-pivotal at
P , he is also xy-pivotal at ' P .)
12Remark
Remark that if P  and  ' P  only differ in  xy  for agent  , and   is  i f xy -sensitive at P
(and ' P ), then i  is  xy -pivotal at P  (and ' P ).
The proof is organized through a sequence of simple Lemmas.
Lemma 1
If  is  i xy -pivotal at profile P ,' P  only differs from P  in  j 's ranking of
 and  , then i  is still xy-pivotal at ^` w z, z ^ y x, ` ) ' ( ) ( P f P   f ' P .
Proof
Just notice that, since  ) ' ( ) ( P f P f    and i is xy-pivotal , it must be that 
D D . , (P G ^` , ' ( ) , \ P G y x   ^ , \ y x `)
Lemma 2
There cannot be any profile   at which two different agents i  and  P j  are  xy -pivotal
and -pivotal, respectively, with  yz x  and   contiguous in   and y and z contiguous in  . y i P j P
Proof
Suppose there was, and that  ,  were the preferences (with x and y contiguous in 
, and y and z contiguous in  ) such that  , . Then, 
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There is an agent who concentrates all power under rule  . f
13Proof
Since  is flexible,   and  fP X z y x  , ,  such that 
(1) the set ^  is connected in the preferences of all agents at  ` z y x , , P , and 
(2)  is  f xy -sensitive and also -sensitive at  yz P .
 Notice  that, since f  is  xy -sensitive at P  there must exist  ' P ,
' ' P  such that they only
differ on ^  in i and  . Similarly, there must exist  ` y x, ) " ( ( P g P
xy
f ) ' z g
xy
f P ˆ , P
~
 and  j such that 




f ) ˆ (P g
yz
f z
Since y x,  and   are connected, it is possible to find a profile  z P  where  y x,  and 
are still connected, where ^  are contiguous in 
z
` y x, i P , ^` z y,  are contiguous in  j P , and i  is 
xy -pivotal, while j is -pivotal. We use here condition 3 in the definition of flexibility, since
in such profile the relative position of 
yz
xz  or  may be different that at the original zy P . Only
one of these two needs to be changed in order to meet the requirements. To see that, notice 
that if an agent is  xy -pivot when  x  and   are contiguous, the agent is still pivot when its 
preferences over 
y
x  and   are switched.  y
But now we have the conditions of Lemma 1. Hence, only one agent can be pivotal at 
this profile, and it is pivotal for two different pairs. 
From this point on, we can start switching the preferences of any agent for different 
pairs of contiguous alternatives including any one of the three alternatives  y x,
i
 or   in
question. No such change alter the outcome if it happens for any agent other than  , since that 
would lead us to the situation of Lemma 2. Hence, at some profile we shall eventually get a
pivot for the pair, and this pivot will necessarily be i  again. That general argument can be 
applied repeatedly to conclude that the same agent i  must be pivot at some profile for all pairs 
of alternatives and hence concentrate all the power under  .
z
f
3. Some applications and corollaries 
In what follows, I present a sketchy discussion of why the new theorem does indeed cover 
the setups for which different results were initially formulated, and how the particular 
conditions under which the classical theorems hold are particular versions of those imposed
here.
143.1. Arrow's framework and Theorem 
We have already discussed why Arrowian Social Welfare functions are local and 
restricted. Notice now that the Pareto condition imposed by Arrow implies flexibility. Indeed, 
for profiles where all agents agree that x is preferred to  , y x must be preferred to y socially, 
and the reverse must hold when all agents rank   over  y x. By changing the preferences one by 
one, reversing the order of x and  , starting from a profile where  y x and   are contiguous 
and all agents prefer 
y
x to  , and moving to one where they all prefer   to  yy x, it must be that
one agent is xy-pivotal at some of the profiles in this sequence. This can be done for other 
pairs . Moreover, yz xy-pivotality and  -pivotality can be preserved in profiles where the 
conditions of flexibility do hold. 
yz
It is thus obvious that an Arrowian social welfare function must be a local, restricted 
and flexible aggregator: hence, all the decision power must be concentrated in an agent.
Moreover, again by Pareto, this agent obtains the ranking x over   whenever he prefers  y x to
: this is the dictator. y
3.2. Wilson’s theorem 
The initial framework is the same as Arrow’s: IIA implies locality and transitivity
implies that the aggregation function is restricted.
Unlike in Arrow’s formulation, flexibility does not come from Pareto, but from the 
range condition requiring that x should be ranked above   for some profile, and below   for
some other. The same construction as before, but having as extremes two such profiles with 
yy
x
and  contiguous, shows the existence of  y xy-pivots for all pairs. Hence, one agent always 
concentrates all decision power: but this agent may be getting always the same order among
pairs of alternatives that he expresses, or the reverse. Because Pareto does not necessarily 
apply, the individual who concentrates the power may be a dictator or an anti-dictator. Other
combinations, where the agent might be a dictator over some pairs, and an anti-dictator over
other pairs are excluded by restriction. For example, if some pairs were ordered according to 
the preferences of one agent and others in the opposite direction than the preferences of the 
same agent, this could easily lead to cycles.
On the other hand, we may consider the constant function as an example of an 
aggregation rule which satisfies all of our conditions except for flexibility and locality
6. This is 
the other type of aggregator obtained by Wilson, again violating the Pareto condition. 
6 If we had chosen to use a more general definition of locality as discussed in Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995),
then the constant function could be accommodated among the local ones, while still violating flexibility.
153.3. Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal 
The essential remark regarding Sen’s result is that, it postulates explicitly as desiderata
the two conditions which are stated by our theorem to be incompatible under local and 
restricted rules. One of them is the Pareto condition: we have already seen that this condition,
for a universal domain of preferences, implies that the aggregation function must be flexible. 
The other condition imposed by Sen is that at least two agents must be able to determine the 
strict ranking of two alternatives each (these two alternatives describe social states which are 
identical except for some features over which the agent in question is entitled to have full 
control. This is the condition of (minimal) liberalism, a condition which is in open 
contradiction with the possibility of one agent holding all the decision power under an 
aggregation rule. The interpretation of this ability to determine the ranking of some
alternatives is subject to debate, because Sen is referring to rights, and their connection to 
choices is not an obvious one. In the present paper I limit myself to comments about the 
formal structure in Sen's formulation, not about its meaning(s).
Since Sen requires two conditions which are incompatible for any local and restricted 
rule, it is enough for us to argue that he is considering, in his theorem, rules that can be written
as members of this class. No explicit argument is provided by Sen regarding the general 
structure of the functions he considers: hence, some characteristics of these functions for some
special profiles might escape the description (and hence the full force) of our theorem. But
remember that the theorem contains two statements: one is about the impossibility of
allocating pivotal rights to more than one individual at the same profile (the local aspect, step 
one of the proof), and the other is the extension of this local argument to a global one. We
only need the local result to understand Sen’s impossibility. When it applies, the Pareto 
principle allows us to ascertain that the aggregate must be among the class of binary relations
respecting the agents’ unanimous ranking of a pair. Likewise, the rankings of pairs associated 
to the private domain of an agent depend only (by the assumption of minimal liberalism) on 
the interested agent’s ranking of these pairs. Hence, the aggregate for profiles where Pareto
applies and agents have strict preferences over the pairs of their exclusive concern must be in 
the intersection of those sets of aggregates respecting the above conditions, as in a local 
aggregation rule. Now, the aggregate is required by Sen to be an acyclic rule, and this imposes
a restriction on the choice of aggregates, which cannot be respected at profiles where Pareto 
applies and both agents with rights can exert them.
3.4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
I have already discussed why a strategy-proof social choice function is a local and 
restricted aggregator. Moreover, strategy-proofness guarantees that, whenever the range of the
rule contains at least three alternatives, then there must be profiles where some agent is pivotal
for more than one pair. My 1983 proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem establishes (step 
g) the following consequence of strategy-proofness: if no individual is ever pivotal under 
for more than two alternatives, then the range of  consists of at most two alternatives. 
Moreover, the construction in Gibbard’s proof that determines whether each alternative is 
f
f
16excluded or is not at a profile can only depend on the positions of pairs of alternatives, when 
 is strategy-proof. This gives us the second part of flexibility. We can now refer to the 
general theorem to obtain dictatorship. 
f
4. Final Remarks
I have proven the theorem for the case where the range of each partial selection rule 
consists of two sets only. The proof is sufficient to cover the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. It 
is also sufficient to cover the versions of the rest of the theorems we mention (Arrow, Wilson,
Sen) where society's preferences are required to be strict. But since these theorems also hold 
when societies (as well as individuals) are allowed to express indifferences, it would be
interesting to discuss how our theorem should be extended to cover the case of three-valued 
(or many-valued) ranges. The same basic ideas apply, but further definitions and some delicate 
distinctions must be made. I leave this extension for another paper.
REFERENCES
Aizerman, M. and F. Aleskerov (1995): "Theory of Choice", North Holland, Elsevier Science,
Amsterdam.
Arrow, K. (1963): "Social Choice and Individual Values", 2nd edition, Wiley: New York. 
Barberà, S. (1980): "Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem", Economics Letters 6,
13-16.
Barberà, S. (1983a): "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem", International Economic Review 24, 2, 413-418. 
Barberà, S. (1983b): "Pivotal Voters: A Simple Proof of Arrow's Theorem", in P.K. Pattanaik 
and M. Salles (Eds.), Social Choice and Welfare, North Holland. 
Barberà, S., Gul, F. and E. Stacchetti (1993): "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and 
Committees", Journal of Economic Theory  61, 262-289. 
Barberà, S. and Peleg, B. (1990): "Strategy-proof Voting Schemes with Continuous 
Preferences", Social Choice and Welfare 7, 31-38.
Batteau, P., Blin, J-M. and B. Monjardet (1981): "Stability of Aggregation Procedures, 
Ultrafilters and Simple Games", Econometrica 40, 527-534.
Benoit, J-P. (2000): "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Simple Proof", Economics
Letters 69, 319-322. 
17Eliaz, K. (2001): "Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Are Special 
Cases of a Single Theorem", mimeo, Tel-Aviv University.
Gibbard, A. (1973): "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result", Econometrica 41, 
587-601.
Guilbaud, G. Th. (1952): “Les Théories de l’Intérêt Général et le Problème Logique de
l’Aggrégation“, Economie Appliquée 5, 501-584. English translation in P.F Lazarsfeld and
N.W. Henry (Eds.) Readings in Mathematical Social Sciences (Science Research association
Inc.-Chicago, 1965) pp. 262-307. 
Mueller, E. and A. Satterthwaite (1977): "The Equivalence of Strong Positive Association and
Strategy-Proofness", Journal of Economic Theory 14, 412-418. 
Reny, P.J. (2001): "Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified 
Approach", Economics Letters 70, 99-105. 
Saari, D. (1998): “Connecting and Resolving Sen’s and Arrow’s Theorems”, Social Choice 
and Welfare 15, 239-261. 
Salles, M. (2001): "Amartya Sen: Droits et Choix Social", Revue Economique 81-3, 445-457. 
Satterthwaite, M. (1975): "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and 
Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions", Journal of 
Economic Theory 10, 187-217. 
Schmeidler, D. and H. Sonnenschein (1978): "Two Proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
Theorem on the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions", in H.W. Gottinger and 
W. Leinfellner (eds.), Decision Theory and Social Ethics, Issues in Social Choice, 227-234, D.
Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. 
Sen, A.K. (1970): "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal", Journal of Political Economy 78,
152-157.
Sen, A. (2001): "Another Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem", Economics
Letters 70, 381-385 (2001). 
Vickrey, W.S. (1969): "Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 74, 507-535. 
Wilson, R. (1972): "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle", Journal of Economic Theory
5, 478-486. 
18